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J.M. Balkin*
This essay concerns one of the apparent casualties of the rise
of postmodernism-the theory of ideology. In fact, the "theory of
ideology" has never been a unitary theory. From its inception the
concept of ideology has always been contested, and hence the the-
ory has generated many variations.' The most common version as-
serts that individuals are afflicted with beliefs that in some way
mystify or obscure social reality. This mystification in turn works
to the advantage of some classes and to the disadvantage of others.
This formulation was developed most prominently within the
marxist tradition; it has proved a tempting but ultimately unsatis-
factory paradigm to explain all sorts of ideological phenomena that
bear little resemblance to marxist class struggle.z
In recent years postmodern theorists have subjected the marx-
ist theory of ideology to considerable criticism.' Some scholars,
perhaps inspired in part by Michel Foucault, have abandoned the
study of ideology altogether for the study of discourse, hoping that
this substitution will permit a better understanding of the many so-
cial injustices-like racism, sexism, and homophobia-that tran-
scend the boundaries of economic class.4 Nevertheless, replacing
the study of ideology with the study of discourse does not 'alter the
basic questions that gave rise to the theory of ideology in the first
place, nor does it obviate the most troubling problems of this
theory.
One reason for this is that the theory of ideology, like the
study of discourse associated with postmodernism, has always been
part of a larger endeavor. This more general endeavor is the phi-
losophy of culture. The ancient Greek world distinguished be-
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tween physis, the world of nature, and nomos, the world of
convention, law, and culture. The philosophical study of nomos in-
cludes ethics and political theory. However, it also includes culture
itself as a philosophical problem and an object of study.
The philosophy of culture has a rich tradition and many illus-
trious forbearers, of whom Giambattista Vico, Jean-Jacques Rous-
seau, Immanuel Kant, and Georg W.F. Hegel are perhaps the most
prominent. Some of the questions which the philosophy of culture
asks are these: What is the relationship of culture to human exist-
ence and human history? What role does culture play in producing
the faculty of human reason? Is human history, and hence the his-
tory of culture, a tragedy or a comedy, or is it a story with no deter-
minate end and no narrative coherence or unity? Later
philosophers, like Marx and Nietzsche, emphasized a further ques-
tion, namely, the question of power. What power do culture and
symbolic forms have over individuals? How can individuals recog-
nize this power and what, if anything, can or should they do about
it? From this perspective, the study of discourse, like the study of
ideology, is merely the latest in a series of approaches to the philos-
ophy of culture. The basic questions it asks are very much the
same, and the problems it encounters are very similar.
In this Essay I discuss some of the problems in the philosophy
of culture through an extended metaphor-the metaphor of cul-
tural software. I compare certain features of culture, and the way
that culture works, to the software that is installed on a computer
and that enables a computer to process information.
This metaphor is misleading in several respects. First, I do not
believe that the human mind works like any existing computer.
Nor do I believe that thinking is primarily a mechanical or al-
gorithmic process. On the contrary, human thinking is distin-
guished by its symbolic and metaphoric character, and its
fundamental motivation in human values. Second, although I shall
speak loosely of "biological hardware" and "cultural software," the
distinction between hardware and software is not the same for
humans as it is for computers. Each individual has a unique brain
structure that is the product of genetic inheritance and is shaped
and organized by her experiences and activities, especially those in
early childhood. Thus, it is highly misleading to think of individu-
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als as consisting of identical hardware into which identical copies of
software are inserted. 5
The growth of cognitive science and the search for forms of
artificial intelligence have led naturally to comparisons between
human beings and computers. One of the most important debates
currently raging in the philosophy of mind is the extent to which
mind should be defined functionally in terms of information states,
like those in a computer. Some philosophers of mind have gone so
far as to argue that the human mind is, at basis, indistinguishable
from a computer, while others have asserted that the intentional
nature of human intelligence makes such comparisons thoroughly
inappropriate.6
Although these debates are interesting, they are to a large ex-
tent peripheral to the concerns of this essay. Unlike most cognitive
scientists and most philosophers of mind, my focus is on the mind's
relationship to culture and not its ultimate structure.7 Howard
Gardner has noted that although most cognitive scientists "do not
necessarily bear any animus against the affective realm, against the
context that surrounds any action or thought, or against any histor-
ical or cultural analyses, they attempt to factor out these elements
to the maximum extent possible."' It is quite possible that the
computational metaphor of mind has encouraged this trend. For
these reasons, Jerome Bruner, himself one of the founders of the
cognitive revolution, has recently called for a renewed emphasis on
"the concept of meaning and the processes by which meanings are
created and negotiated within a community."9 These concerns lie
at the heart of this essay; they motivate my use of the metaphor of
cultural software. I am interested in using this metaphor as a meta-
phor, to illuminate the ways in which human beings are constituted
by and express their values within a culture.
The philosophy of culture is also the philosophy of history: it
asks how people exist as members of a culture in history. History
is a peculiarly human phenomenon; the Grand Canyon changes in
5 For an accessible discussion of brain physiology explaining why such a simplistic
hardware/software model must be wrong, see GERALD M. EDELMAN, BRIGHT AIR, BRIL-
LIANT FiRE: ON THE MATrER OF THE MIN (1992).
6 Compare PHILIP N. JOHNSON-LAIRD, THE COMPUTER AND THE MIND: AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE (1988) and HILARY PUTNAM, REPRESENTATION AND RE-
ALITY (1989) with JOHN SEARLE, MINDS, BRAINS, AND SCIENCE (1984).
7 I should note that the very attempt to divorce these issues is itself controversial. See
EDELMAN, supra note 5.
8 HOWARD GARDNER, THE MIND'S NEW SCIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE COGNITIVE
REvOLUTION 41 (1985).
9 JEROME BRUNER, Acrs OF MEANING 11 (1990).
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time, but only human beings have history. Or more correctly, the
Grand Canyon has a natural history, but only human beings have a
cultural history, which is history proper. Human beings begin to
have history only at the moment when they enter into culture,
which is also the moment that they begin to create collectively
shared and created tools for understanding the world and articulat-
ing their values.
Culture is, in this sense, a set of collectively created tools of
understanding. This brings us to another basic metaphor: that of
the tool. Human beings are toolmakers and tool users. Culture
itself is a tool. It is a tool used to make other tools.
Of course tools are always used for something. If culture is a
tool, what is it used for? Human beings use culture for at least
three interlocking and interrelated purposes. The first is to get
about the world, to understand it and make use of it. The second is
to interact with others as others, rather than as objects of manipu-
lation. The third is to articulate and express human values.
I specifically distinguish these three purposes because many
people think of tools and toolmaking only with respect to the first
purpose. They understand tools largely as a way of exploring and
mastering the natural world. This mastery can either be material
or intellectual-either through controlling and shaping nature or
through understanding her. Nevertheless, if this were the only pur-
pose in toolmaking, the conception of culture as a set of tools, and
the conception of humankind as toolmaker and tool user, would be
significantly impoverished. Human culture would be thoroughly
instrumental, nothing more than a means by which human beings
mastered their environment. This conception of culture would fail
to recognize the existence of other human beings, or in the alterna-
tive, it would view them as just another set of objects to be con-
trolled, governed, studied, and mastered. Similarly, the concept of
reason developed through culture would be reduced to instrumen-
tal rationality. It would not be able to reason about values or ends,
but only about means.10
Human beings have values, and these values are one of the
most important features of human life. Or more correctly, human
10 We may justly criticize a culture to the extent to which it is primarily or excessively
concerned with instrumental rationality at the expense of other forms of reason. Neverthe-
less, we should not confuse this criticism with a criticism of the metaphor of toolmaking or
with the conception of human beings as toolmakers. That criticism is valid only if toolmak-
ing really has no other purposes besides the mastery of objects. The critic's assumption
that this is so, may itself be a symptom of living in a culture that has placed too high an
emphasis on instrumental concerns and instrumental rationality.
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beings value, because value is properly a verb, not a noun. I think
this point especially worth stressing. Human beings possess an in-
exhaustible drive to evaluate, to pronounce what is good and bad,
beautiful and ugly, advantageous and disadvantageous. Before cul-
ture, human values are inchoate and indeterminate; through cul-
ture they become differentiated, articulated, and refined."
Now these purposes-understanding, interaction, and articu-
lation-overlap. Getting about in the world and dealing with
others presupposes ends and hence presupposes human values.
Conversely, one of the most important human values is the urge to
know and understand the world; it is related to the drive to master
all problems and obstacles placed before us.
We employ the tools of culture towards these ends. For sim-
plicity's sake, we might identify three basic types of cultural tools
that human beings use, while keeping in mind that the three are
not easily separated in practice. The first is technology, the second
is institutions, and the third is cultural know-how, or what I would
like to call cultural software.
What is cultural software? It consists of the associations,
heuristics, metaphors, and capacities that we employ in the process
of understanding and evaluation. An example of technology is a
computer. An example of an institution is a bank. An example of
cultural software is linguistic ability. Technology makes tools from
materials, institutions make tools from human sociability, and cul-
tural software makes tools from human understanding.
These cultural tools are interdependent and interrelated. For
example, the institution of a bank may presuppose technology in
the form of buildings, computers, furniture, and a workforce
trained in a certain way, with certain understandings and abilities.
Nevertheless, different philosophers of culture have emphasized
some features more than others. For example, Marx emphasized
the role of technology, and Vico emphasized the role of institu-
tions. 12 But the third type of tool-cultural software-is equally
important. Without cultural software, our technology lies on the
ground, rusted from disuse, and our institutions fall apart. The bib-
11 The phenomenon of articulation of inchoate human values is discussed more fully in
J.M. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1131,
1139-41 (1994). My views have been greatly influenced by Thomas Seung. See T.K.
SEUNG, INTUITION AND CONSTRucrION: THE FOUNDATION OF NORMATIVE THEORY
(1993).
12 See JON ELSTER, MAKING SENSE OF MARX 143, 267-68 (1985); LEON POMPA, VICO:
A STUDY OF THE "NEw SCIENCE" 30-34; 39-45 (2d ed. 1990).
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lical story of the Tower of Babel is a good example of what be-
comes of technology and institutions without cultural software.
The comparison between computer software and cultural
software encompasses two basic ideas. The first is that software is
an indispensable tool for processing information and performing
tasks. The second is that this software is an indispensable part of
what we mean by "the computer."
Let me address these two points in turn. First, a computer
uses software in order to process information. Without this
software it cannot do its job; it cannot interact with the environ-
ment around it. If you boot up a computer but do not put any
software in it, it just sits there and does nothing. You can type on it
all you want, but it will not respond, or at best it will spit out an
error message. It cannot process information because it has noth-
ing to process information with. At best its ability to process infor-
mation is primitive and unhelpful. Only when you install software
can it do anything useful, and even then the type of information it
can process depends on the kind of software installed. The most
massive supercomputer installed with a checkers program still can
only play checkers, although it can probably play checkers very
quickly indeed. The potential power of the computer remains con-
stant, but its practical power is severely limited. As software be-
comes increasingly developed so too does the practical power of
the computer. In this way the potential power of the hardware is
only fully realized through the development of increasingly elabo-
rate software. Thus, we might say in a very loose sense that
software empowers hardware.
The second point is that this software is, to a very important
extent, constitutive of the computer, or rather, what we unthink-
ingly call the computer. Often what we mean by "the computer" is
really the software together with the computer. Thus I might say
that I wrote this essay on my computer, but really I wrote it using a
word processing program installed on my computer. Note more-
over, that a computer, or more precisely, a program running on a
computer, becomes different from what it was before with each in-
put of data. After each keystroke, the state of the computer is dif-
ferent, and how it processes succeeding information is different,
based on what went before. Of course, with most software, the
basic program remains unchanged each time someone runs it. It
returns to a basic state after the program is exited and the com-
puter is turned off. The only thing that changes is the data that has
been manipulated. However, in fact, it is possible to design pro-
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grams that are partially rewritten each time they are run, in re-
sponse to the data previously entered, and the tasks previously
performed.
This second point has a corollary: in order for hardware and
software to interact, both must have a capacity to process informa-
tion. My word processing program allows my computer to process
information, but it can do so only because it is loaded onto another
program, an operating system like DOS or UNIX, that allows the
computer to run software. Hence, the information processing per-
mitted by the software requires a prior information processor to
employ it. Similarly, the operating system only runs because the
computer has a program in firmware that allows it to understand
and process the commands it receives from the operating system.
Finally, this firmware can only operate because the hardware of the
computer allows it to process the commands of the firmware at a
mechanical level. Thus, the distinction between hardware and
software is not a distinction between the part of the computer that
processes information and the part that does not-rather, informa-
tion processing occurs all the way down.
The distinction between hardware and software must be ex-
plained differently. In theory, my word processing program could
be hard-wired into the computer. It could become part of the
hardware. But in practice it is more convenient to allow me to
remove it and substitute different programs, or upgrade the pro-
gram that I have. This is the great advantage of software as an
information processing device. It is easily changeable and adapta-
ble; it creates the possibility of many different types of hardware/
software combinations, and hence many different types of
computers. 13
Just as computer software allows computers to harness their
power, cultural software empowers human beings. The human
mind is a marvelous device, but like the most powerful supercom-
puter, it needs methods of understanding if its power is to be
tapped. Our cultural software is the result of a long process of col-
lective accumulation and construction. This process has produced
elaborate tools of understanding, which, in conjunction with tech-
nology and institutions, can be tremendously empowering.
Of course, cultural software is not only empowering in the
sense of allowing us to achieve our goals. It also enables us to re-
13 For an evolutionary argument describing how the capacity to employ "software"




flect upon and describe what our goals are. Cultural software al-
lows human beings to articulate and concretize their values, to put
flesh on the bones of their innate but inchoate urge to value and
evaluate. Through cultural software our brute sense of the beauti-
ful is transformed into the many varieties of aesthetic judgment,
some of which come into being and fade away at different points in
history. Through cultural software the inchoate sense of good and
bad is transformed into the many varieties of moral and practical
judgment, and the many virtues and vices are articulated and dif-
ferentiated. Thus cultural softwareis the great enabling device not
only of human understanding, but also of human evaluation. For
this reason alone, it is the greatest of human creations, the most
powerful and important of human tools.
Nevertheless, the tools of understanding that I call cultural
software are different from hammers and nails. Hammers and nails
are made by human beings but are separate from them. I can pick
up a hammer or put it down. I can carry it with me or leave it at
home. Not so with the tools of understanding. The tools of under-
standing work by becoming part of my apparatus of understanding,
which is to say, they work by becoming part of me. Thus, cultural
software is not just something that we ue to understand and evalu-
ate the world; it is also part of us. Indeed, we might even say that
human beings do not become persons until they enter into culture,
and hence become imbued with some form of cultural software. To
exist as a person is to exist as a person who is part biological hard-
ware and part cultural software. The two together constitute the
person, just as what we sometimes mean by "the computer" is both
its electronic hardware and the information coded as software.
And just as the computer is only able to use software because it
already has an information processing capacity, human beings are
able to use culture only because they are already toolmakers and
tool users. In the case of humans (but not computers) this also
means that they already have ends and values, already can get
around in the world using their natural tools, and can use tools to
assist their natural tools.
An equally important aspect of cultural software, which is not
true of all forms of computer software, is the fact that it is collec-
tively created by the individuals who are constituted by it. Lan-
guage is perhaps the most prominent form of collective cultural
software. Like language, the forms of cultural software are con-
stantly being written and rewritten. Just as languages evolve over
time, so do the many forms of cultural software. This process of
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evolution is one of bricolage-by which I mean starting with the
available tools at hand and innovating on that basis. This collective
product, the tools of understanding, evolves and mutates over time,
and as it changes so, too, do the human beings who are constituted
by it. In this way, we can see the history of humanity as the history
of an ever changing and mutating set of tools of understanding,
which are built on previous versions. To return to our computer
metaphor, the history of culture is the history of perpetual up-
grades to our cultural software. But unlike computer software, this
process is not discrete but gradual, and none of us ever have identi-
cal copies.
The theory of cultural software is also a theory of historical
existence. To exist in history means to be the bearer of a particular
type of cultural software. So historical existence is not merely
existence in time, but existence at a time when one is constituted
by a particular form of cultural software. A person living in the
sixteenth century has a different kind of existence from a person
living in the twentieth. The biological hardware may remain
roughly the same, but the cultural software is different. As a result,
the person, who is the interaction of this biological hardware with
cultural software, is different. This explains the difference between
a person and the Grand Canyon. The Grand Canyon exists in
time, but only people exist in history, because only people are con-
stituted by an evolving, collectively created cultural software.
The theory of cultural software is also a theory of understand-
ing. Human understanding is understanding in history. It is made
possible by the tools of understanding, which bear the marks of
their historical development. Thus, there is an intimate connection
between historical existence and historical understanding, between
living in history and understanding in history. This is another way
of expressing Hans-Georg Gadamer's point that human under-
standing is made possible by, rather than hindered by, location
within a tradition, and what he calls prejudice or prejudgment. 14
Indeed, you might think of the theory of cultural software as a sort
of hi-tech analogue to the Gadamerian concept of tradition. To be
human is just to be constituted by some type of cultural software,
the product of a certain history of conceptual bricolage and evolu-
tion. This is both the meaning of historical existence and the condi-
tion of human understanding.
14 See HANS-GEORO GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 239-40, 245-53 (Garrett Barden
& John Cumming eds. & trans., Crossroad 1975) (2d ed. 1965).
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Put still another way, the theory of cultural software takes lit-
erally the contemporary chestnut that individuals are socially con-
structed. People become people only when they enter into culture,
which is to say, only when culture enters into them, and becomes
them, at the moment when they are programmed with and hence
constituted by tools of understanding created by a culture at a cer-
tain point in history. People obtain and incorporate cultural tools,
which become as much a part of them as their arms and legs.
The notion of cultural construction is often associated with
cultural determinism. But the notion of cultural software suggests
why this view is misleading. Cultural software empowers individu-
als even as it creates them. It untaps the potential power of the
human mind just as an increasingly complicated and sophisticated
software program allows a computer to do more. Therefore, we
must understand cultural software as constitutive not only of iden-
tity, but of autonomy as well. The confusion of cultural construc-
tion with cultural determinism misunderstands what culture does
for human beings. Culture is not the source of mechanical obedi-
ence but rather the wellspring of what we call freedom. Cultural
software, rather than the enemy of human autonomy, forms the
very conditions of its possibility.
This point leads us, at last, to a reevaluation of the concepts of
ideology and discourse. Although cultural software empowers in-
dividuals, it also creates a certain opportunity for power over indi-
viduals who are constituted by it. It does both of these things at
one and the same time and through the same mechanism. The
power that cultural software makes possible is precisely the power
that the tools of understanding have over the individuals who are
partly constituted by them. This power is of two types. The first
arises from the limitations of our conceptual apparatus; it is some-
what like the very powerful computer that only has a checkers pro-
gram. The second type of power is more subtle. It arises from the
nature of information processing itself, and it is never fully elimi-
nated, no matter how sophisticated the software becomes.
Processing information always requires partiality and selectiv-
ity. As Heraclitus recognized, the world is in perpetual flux; we
cannot comprehend its nature in all of its infinite diversity and dif-
ferentiation.' 5 Without some form of simplification, in the form of
categorization, narrative, heuristics, or norms, it is impossible to
understand anything at all. Information requires simplification-
15 See G.S. KIRK & J.E. RAVEN, THE PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS: A CRITICAL His-
TORY WITH A SELECTION OF TExTs 197 (1975).
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taming the flux for the purpose of understanding; and thus, at the
very moment when understanding is made possible, partiality also
emerges. I often like to say that the key to information is in forma-
tion; it lies in the selection and categorization of the flux of experi-
ence into comprehensible categories, events, and narratives. To
understand we must establish similarities and differences, catego-
ries and narratives, canons and heuristics. These are the basis of all
information, and hence the basis of our cultural software. Hence
our cultural software limits even as it empowers. It informs us in
forming us, which is to say that it informs us in forming our selves
as selves endowed with a certain form of cultural software, who see
things one way and not another, who are properly "tooled up" for
some tasks but not for others. Thus, cultural software has power
over us because this power is rooted in the very way that we are
able to process information and articulate values.
Individuals within a culture can take advantage of the partial-
ity of our cultural software. They can gain power over us because
we, like they, are constituted by the tools of understanding. The
most obvious example of this power is the power of symbols and
rhetoric. Rhetoric has power because rhetorical features are al-
ready lodged in our cultural software. Symbols have power be-
cause the associations which make them symbols are already part
of us. Hence, the study of rhetoric or the study of semiotics may be
thought of as the study of cultural software, or more properly, the
study of the traces and effects of cultural software. The study of
cultural software is the study of the building blocks of our under-
standing, and therefore the study of the forms and modes of power
exercisable over that understanding. At the same time it is the
study of reason itself-the culturally created reason that is the ba-
sis of our practical action.
Thus, the theory of cultural software rethinks the traditional
conception of ideology in two ways. First, it sees ideological power
as the power that cultural software has over the persons who are
constituted by it, who are persons because of it. Instead of viewing
ideology as false beliefs held by subjects who preexist those beliefs,
it locates the source of ideological power in the constitution of sub-
jectivity itself. This subjectivity is not simply the meaning that
others assign to you, but the meaning that you assign to the world
itself through the shared tools of cultural software.
Second, the theory of cultural software argues that ideology
must be understood not only through its negative effects but also
through its positive ones. Ideology does not merely obscure; it
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clarifies. It does not merely limit the imagination but empowers it
as well. The theory of cultural software thus rejects what I like to
call the "pathological" view of ideology, which sees ideology as a
disease or a decrepit form of human thought. In the theory of cul-
tural software, the mechanisms of ideological thought are the
mechanisms of everyday thought. In this theory, truth and falsity,
deception and empowerment enter through the same door.
There has always been debate in the literature on ideology as
to whether the concept of ideology is necessarily pejorative-that
is, opposed to truth or science-or instead may be a neutral de-
scription with no pejorative content.'6 A similar question arises for
the study of discourse: Do we study discourse neutrally as a general
feature of social life, or is our goal to expose unjust relations of
power? The theory I propose offers a third conception. It is an
ambivalent conception of ideology and discourse. Cultural
software both empowers and disempowers. It is both a source of
mystification and enlightenment, and these features are not always
easily separated from each other. The ambivalent conception al-
lows us to engage in ideological critique of our culture while recog-
nizing how culture nevertheless enables us and enhances our
freedom.
In this way, the theory of cultural software has a distinct ad-
vantage over both the pejorative and the neutral conceptions of
ideology. The pejorative conception founders on what has been
called Mannheim's paradox: If all discourse is ideological, how is it
possible to have anything other than an ideological discourse on
ideology? 17 This problem arises from the uniformly negative con-
notations of ideology in the pejorative conception. The neutral
conception solves this problem by treating ideology as a nonjudg-
mental term. Yet a neutral conception cannot be fully successful,
for, as Mannheim himself pointed out, evaluation eventually works
its way into all studies of ideology and discourse.' 8
Mannheim's paradox disappears, however, when it is stated in
terms of the theory of cultural software. It may be true that all
discourse about cultural software must be stated through the use of
cultural software. Yet, this is not an insurmountable obstacle be-
16 See MICHPLE BARRETT, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH: FROM MARX TO FOUCAULT 18-19
(1991).
17 See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 194 (1973); PAUL
RICOUER, LECTURES ON IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 157 (Geoge H. Taylor, ed., 1986).
18 See KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOL-
OGY OF KNOWLEDGE 88-89 (Louis Wirth & Edward Shils trans., Harvest/HBJ 1985)
(1936).
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cause the tools of understanding are empowering as well as limit-
ing. They are enabling as well as confusing; indeed, they form the
very conditions of autonomy and self-discovery. Cultural software
always creates the possibility of a critical engagement with itself.
By retracing the origins of the theories of ideology and discourse to
the philosophy of culture, we vindicate the possibility of a critical
approach to thought and belief. Like a clever entrepreneur, the
theory of cultural software sees opportunity in what others regard
as hopeless difficulty; where others see ideological determinacy, it
sees the promise of critical possibility.

